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Context and aims 
• International Joint Ventures (IJVs): important means for companies to achieve their strategic 
goals in international business environment; however, a high record of failure of IJVs in terms 
of satisfying the strategic objectives of the partner companies - could be attributed to IJV 
“fragile” form of governance - shared sovereignty and incomplete contracting (Pearce, 1997; 
Filatotchev and Wright, 2011) 
• Importance of IJV board directors for IJV success:  the partners’ control over IJV board 
directors more direct than that exercised by dispersed and anonymous shareholders because 
IJV partners are identifiable owners with a possible investment in strong corporate governance 
(CG) (Carver, 2000).  
• Uniqueness and potential complexity of IJV board director role: IJV shared governance 
structure and the presence of two or more partner organisations of different national and 
organisational cultures and possibly divergent agendas about their IJV, require IJV board 
members maintain inter-partner relationships and manage different partners’ agendas in the 
overall interests of the venture (Bamford and Ernst, 2005)  
• However, academic debate limited in its understanding of IJV director role and contribution to 
board effectiveness. 
  
The research has sought to: 
• To examine how IJV directors contribute to board effectiveness, utilising a role theoretical 
framework (Katz and Kahn, 1978; Fondas and Stewart, 1994).  
• Identify behaviour of individual IJV board directors and factors that affect and are affected by 
their behaviour. 
• Propose a model that captures contribution to board effectiveness from an individual IJV board 
director’s perspective. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Methods 
• Qualitative exploratory case study (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
• The case (unit of the analysis): an individual IJV board director 
• Study design: multiple case study - 13 cases/board directors from 3 Serbian-foreign joint 
ventures based in Serbia 
• Method for data collection: multiple (i.e., interviews, research of documentation, informal 
observation) 
• Method for data analysis: qualitative (thematic analysis of data for each individual case and 
comparing the emergent themes between all the cases) in order to draw 
conclusions/propositions (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
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Analysis and Discussion 
Role and Contribution: Different Concepts? 
• The findings show that role and contribution are differentiated in the eyes of the participants: 
role refers to the pre-determined tasks and goal, whilst contribution is about how these tasks 
and goal are performed/fulfilled. 
• Such a view of role differs from both structural and dynamic role theoretical views (Katz and 
Kahn, 1978; Fondas and Stewart, 1994): the participants in this research appear to share 
collective behaviour only in terms of “what is done” (that is, what tasks and goal are being 
performed/pursued); the “how” is more idiosyncratic/unique to each case; the processes and 
“outcomes” mentioned by the participants in relation to their contribution are not used for a 
renegotiating of their role expectations but for the purpose of fulfilment of pre-determined role 
expectations.  
• Such a perception of role has a direct implication for the participants’ view of role discretion. 
  
IJV Board Director Role Discretion 
• The findings show that an IJV board director’s role and prime purpose are almost “rolled into 
one” and already determined: the participants see their role driven by board roles and IJV 
vision that are, in turn, set by the Law and the IJV partners; hence there is no discretion with 
regards to the role - the only discretion is in the way the director performs/achieves pre-
determined tasks and goal, that is, in contribution.  
• This is contrary to Anglo-Saxon CG research views board directors as having considerable role 
discretion as to what the role and prime purpose is (Huse, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005). 
• Given the mixed views on IJV board director role discretion identified in the IJV literature 
(Shenkar and Zeira, 1992; Garrow et al., 2000; Gong et al., 2001; Li and Hambrick, 2005), the 
findings position the concept of role discretion. 
   
IJV Board Director Role Conflict and Ambiguity: “Mystified” 
• Issues identified in the CG literature in terms of the lack of clarity of roles board directors are 
expected to perform (Johnson et al., 1996; Hendry and Kiel, 2004) not applicable in this 
research context: the findings show that IJV board directors are clear about their role/tasks and 
goal/interest that they are expected to pursue, because board roles/tasks are set by the Law 
and the IJV vision is clearly articulated by the partners. 
• Issues of IJV board director role conflict and ambiguity identified by the studies in the IJV 
literature (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992; Gong et al., 2001) appear somewhat “mystified” in this 
context: the findings show that potential contradictions and tensions between the partners and 
their (sometimes conflicting) expectations that the participants need to balance are not seen as 
relating to the participant’s role/goal; this is due to the fact that the participants’ view of different 
partners’ agendas is not related to different partners’ expectations about “what is to be 
achieved” (IJV vision), but about “how it is achieved” (IJV strategy). 
• The findings confirm the importance of taking into account the impact of external context (e.g., 
country/CG system and company factors) on board director role, as advocated by the authors 
in the international CG literature (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Aguilera, 2005) 
  
Importance of Context 
• The findings show a strong impact of context on IJV board director behaviour: the very 
structured legal framework/statutory regulation of CG in Serbia and IJV context/the IJV 
partners’ shared vision about the IJV, provide a framework in which IJV board directors 
operate- IJV board directors have formal tasks with a clear purpose 
• This contrasts with the CG literature where an implicit assumption is that it is individual board 
directors who create “board role expectations” (e.g., Huse, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005) and 
where numerous attempts have been made to conceptualise and clarify roles that board 
directors perform (Johnson et al., 1996; Hendry and Kiel, 2004).  
  
Integration of Role Theoretical Perspectives  
• The findings show the importance of both an individual actor and the social structure in which 
they find themselves for IJV board director behaviour (role and contribution).  
• The study incorporates both structural and interactionist/dynamic perspectives on role, in order 
to provide an integrated role analysis: a significant contribution to the role literature, where a 
presumed identification of role theory with interactionist/dynamic perspective leads to the failure 
of the studies in the field to acknowledge the importance of contextual limits/structural 
constraints, and/or clarify which role theoretical perspective they take.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implications and Impact 
The study makes a number of contributions to theory and practice, including: 
• Enhancing our understanding of IJV board director role. 
• Positioning of the concepts of role, contribution, role discretion, role conflict and ambiguity. 
• Confirming the importance of contextual limits in considering IJV board director behaviour.  
• Presenting a holistic picture of IJV director contribution to board effectiveness that integrates 
different perspectives on role identified in the literature.  
• Broadening of the scope of role theory beyond the "uni-national" company. 
• Given the lack of research on role of individuals in IJVs, this research may be unique in its 
choice of the IJV board director as the focal person in the role behaviour analysis. 
• Extending of the study of board director role in the CG literature to a new area of interest - IJVs.  
• Contribution to the studies of IJV boards which have been largely under-researched. 
• Contributing to the practitioners’ better understanding of the issues and nuances associated 
with governing of IJVs. 
• Providing knowledge of IJV board director behaviour within the Serbian CG system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
